














Where does compassion begin? 
 
Perhaps with the experience of caring.  Caring happens in 
the body and in the moment:  a quick squirt of oxytocin, a firing of 
mirror neurons, the sudden perception of a link between the so-
called self and the so-called other.  Caring is unpredictable and 
unwilled, a reaction, an eruption along the shifting surfaces between 
you and not-you, suddenly experienced in the “flinching of an eye.”  
Kathleen Stewart describes an observer’s emotional reaction to the 
pain of another:   
The young miner who showed me the mine put out 
every cigarette he smoked on his hand, which was 
covered with scar tissue.  Then I saw the other young 
miners all had the backs of their hands covered with 
scar tissue . . . when my eye fell on them it flinched, 
seeing the burning cigarette being crushed and sensing 
the pain . . . . The eye does not read the meaning in a 
sign; it jumps from the mark to the pain and the burning 
cigarette, and then jumps to the fraternity signaled by 
                                                                                                       
*  Professor of Law, University of California—Davis (King Hall).  
Although the participants in this Symposium were instructed to reflect on race 
and Marxism, I found myself reflecting instead on the work of the 
Symposium’s organizer, Anthony Paul Farley.  His classic treatment of the 
pleasures of anti-black racism, The Black Body as Fetish-Object, 76 OR. L. REV. 
457 (1997), continues to instruct all who read it, and his writing and 
speaking—laced always with compassion and outrage—reminds me to watch 
out and take care.  I also wish to thank Caitlin Sislin, who first drew my 
attention to the opinion in Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058 
(9th Cir. 2008), and Tucker Culbertson, who provided helpful comments on 
an early draft of this Essay and whose work constantly pushes me to question 
the boundary of “the human.”  Blunders are all mine. 
  




the burning cigarettes.1 
But compassion also passes through judgment.  The body-
mind, flinching and sparked, engages with the norms that tell us 
how to feel, or not, and what to do, or not.  There is a struggle, or a 
series of choices:  to suffocate the spark or to fan it into a flame that 
may set others alight through emotional contagion; to decide that 
what looked like suffering was actually something else:  reflex, 
perhaps, or cold calculation; to conclude that the suffering is too 
overwhelming, too immense, or too baffling to address, and so to 
turn uneasily away.2  These choices suggest that compassion has a 
relationship with critique.  Harriet Beecher Stowe, in the final 
chapter of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, addresses her readers in the North 
directly about their role in slavery: 
Do you say that the people of the free state[s] have 
nothing to do with it, and can do nothing?  Would to 
God this were true!  But it is not true.  The people of 
the free states have defended, encouraged, and 
participated; and are more guilty for it, before God, than 
the South, in that they have not the apology of 
education or custom . . . . 
But, what can any individual do? Of that, every 
individual can judge.  There is one thing that every 
individual can do,—they can see to it that they feel right.  
An atmosphere of sympathetic influence encircles every 
                                                                                                       
1  KATHLEEN STEWART, ORDINARY AFFECTS 40 (2007) (quoting 
Alphonso Lingis, The Society of Dismembered Body Parts, in DELEUZE AND THE 
THEATRE OF PHILOSOPHY 296 (Constantin Boundas & Dorothea Olkowski 
eds., 1993)).  
2  I draw here on the work of sociologist Candace Clark, who argues 
that “empathy,” or “feeling with” another sentient being, can occur in three 
different modes:  cognitive, physical, and emotional.  CANDACE CLARK, 
MISERY AND COMPANY:  SYMPATHY IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1997).  If we take 
the example of empathizing with another’s pain, cognitive empathy means 
recognizing intellectually that the other is feeling pain.  Id. at 36-37.  Physical 
empathy refers to the physical reactions found in witnesses to suffering—
trembling, rapid heartbeat, nausea, or tears.  Id. at 37.  Emotional empathy, 
which is closely intertwined with physical empathy, is the subjective feeling 
that ordinarily accompanies physical empathy—the sense that one is “feeling 
another’s pain,” or at least experiencing a direct emotional response that seems 
to resonate with the suffering of another.  Id.  These three types of empathy 
apparently can occur either simultaneously or in stages.  Id. at 38.  Culture, in 
the form of social norms, narratives, and rules, obviously may influence the 
experience of empathy in all three of its modes, and Clark devotes much of her 
book to explaining the social rules of empathy in different settings.  
 




human being; and the man or woman who feels strongly, 
healthily and justly, on the great interests of humanity, is 
a constant benefactor to the human race.  See, then, to 
your sympathies in this matter!  Are they in harmony 
with the sympathies of Christ? Or are they swayed and 
perverted by the sophistries of worldly policy?3 
Marx famously wrote, “The philosophers have only 
interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.”4  
Critical theory differs from pure philosophy in its motivation to 
provoke change, and thus it necessarily traffics in the emotions.5  
Challenging power relations, as critical theorists love to do, means 
provoking anger, disquiet, anxiety, and even fear in those with a 
settled understanding of who they are and where they belong.  But 
                                                                                                       
3  HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM’S CABIN:  OR, LIFE 
AMONG THE LOWLY 476 (1852). 
4  KARL MARX, Theses on Feuerbach, in MARX-ENGELS SELECTED 
WORKS, VOL.1, at 13, 15 (1969). 
5  Following Maroney, I will use “emotions” as an umbrella term that 
includes feelings, moods, and affect.  See generally Terry A. Maroney, Law and 
Emotion:  A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 119 
(2006) (establishing a rubric for understanding the legal relevance of emotion) 
[hereinafter Maroney, Law and Emotion].  See also Terry A. Maroney, Emotional 
Competence, Rational Understanding, and the Criminal Defendant, 43 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1375, 1401 (2006) [hereinafter Maroney, Emotional Competence].  Emotions 
are subjective psychological states associated with specific physiological 
processes.  A small list of basic emotions including sadness, surprise, joy, and 
anger, is believed to be experienced by all humans and some nonhuman 
animals.  (The number and definition of these core emotions differ, however, 
depending on who is making the list.  See Maroney, Emotional Competence, supra 
note 5, at 1402 n.147.)  The basic emotions can be combined in elaborate and 
various ways.  People can experience several emotions at once:  in English, we 
speak of having “mixed feelings.”  There are also complicated and subtle 
emotions, sometimes generated by life in a particular place or time, which not 
everyone may experience.  An example is the German term Schadenfreude, 
usually defined as the pleasure one feels in someone else’s misfortune.  It is 
even possible to have emotions about emotions:  to feel ashamed of feeling 
ashamed, for instance, or guilty for feeling happy.  Emotions can be dissected 
into component parts.  The term “feelings” describes the subjective experience 
of an emotion.  The term “mood” is generally used to describe a more diffuse 
subjective state, not necessarily tied to a single emotion.  For instance, people 
with bipolar disease often swing between two families of emotions, or 
moods—excitement, euphoria, benevolence, and joy on the one hand, and 
sadness, apathy, despair, and anxiety on the other.  The term “affect” is used 
both to evaluate emotions (as in the distinction between “positive” and 
“negative” affect) and to refer to the outward expression of a feeling state (for 
example, a person with a “flat affect” is someone who appears to others to be 
lacking in emotion).  Maroney, Emotional Competence, supra note 5, at 1402. 
  




critical theorists are motivated not only by the desire to provoke and 
unsettle,6 but also by the desire to provoke compassion.  Stowe can 
justly be criticized for implying that “feeling right” is sufficient.  
Compassion, however, is not the same as pity; it is the desire to 
relieve another’s suffering, the desire to act.7  Compassion, that is to 
say, may sometimes begin in critique. 
In this Essay, I am interested in the relationship among 
ideology, ideological critique, and emotion.  I argue that the 
ideological critique produced by Marx in the nineteenth century and 
by critical legal theorists in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries 
undertakes not only to persuade our minds but also to rally our 
emotions.  To accomplish this, critical theorists show us that 
ideology is already a technique of emotion management.  Ideology 
makes suffering invisible and compassion inappropriate by assuring 
us that the status quo is natural, normal, and necessary.  Ideological 
critique, in turn, reveals the suffering beneath the bland façade of 
ideological concepts like “capital” and “property.”  It tries to 
persuade us, moreover, that this suffering is unjust and unnecessary:  
that politics and not nature is its source, and that we should act to 
relieve it.   
Like Marx, critical race theorists therefore want us to care 
about the subordinated.8  Yet several pitfalls await.  First, caring 
                                                                                                       
6  For a classic text on the joy of “trashing,” a technique employed in 
critical legal studies, see Mark Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984). 
7  I follow Andrew Taslitz (who in turn follows Paul Ekman and the 
Dalai Lama) in defining compassion as “the active desire to relieve another’s 
suffering.”  See Andrew Taslitz, Why Did Tinkerbell Get Off So Easy? The Roles of 
Imagination and Social Norms in Excusing Human Weakness, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 
419, 426 (2009).  Compassion is, as Taslitz suggests, somewhere between an 
emotion and a character trait:  it must be cultivated to be reliably experienced, 
but once it is deeply rooted in one’s being it takes on the perceptual, 
evaluative, and motivational characteristics of an emotion.  Id. at 427.  See also 
PAUL EKMAN & THE DALAI LAMA, EMOTIONAL AWARENESS:  OVERCOMING 
OBSTACLES TO PSYCHOLOGICAL BALANCE AND COMPASSION: A 
CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE DALAI LAMA AND PAUL EKMAN, PH.D. 166 
(2008) (describing compassion as a combination of the desire to relieve 
suffering and the courage to do whatever is necessary in one’s own life to 
bring this about). 
8  In this Essay, I will use the term “caring” to refer to at least two 
clusters of emotions.  First, and more broadly, caring refers to the feelings, 
moods, and affects associated with concern for another for the other’s own 
sake.  The defining characteristic of this concern is a decentering of the self:  
when we care about someone or something, we want it to flourish regardless 
of whether that flourishing has instrumental value for us.  A paradoxical result 
of setting one’s narrow interests aside is that caring enlarges the self.  If I care 
 




must be connected to moral outrage to produce a commitment to 
action.  Caring without outrage is only merely pity, an emotion that 
requires no action, only the feeling of sympathy.  Critical theorists 
must strive to cultivate indignation as well as caring in their readers’ 
hearts.  A second pitfall is related to the first.  Observing the 
suffering of others may provoke compassion, but it may also 
reinforce a sense of their inferiority, their need for our charity.  
Conversely, a politics rooted in displays of suffering threatens to 
become “therapeutic,” a politics in which the subordinated seek only 
public recognition of their wounds and a sense of moral superiority 
rather than the transformation of social relations.9  Third, critical 
theory must simultaneously convince us that injustice is everywhere, 
and that change is possible.  Critical race theory, for example, takes 
the position that racism pervades our institutions, our beliefs, and 
our everyday practices.10  Critical race theorists thus reject the view 
that racism can easily be rooted out of our lives.  Yet to join the 
battle seems to require some optimism that improvement is 
possible.  Critical race theory thus walks, along with its readers, a 
thin line between hope and despair. 
 
I. EMOTIONAL REASONING 
 
Emotions are increasingly of interest to legal scholars as well 
as scientists.11  Law has long distrusted emotion, treating it as the 
opposite of rationality.12  But researchers are coming to understand 
that emotions are deeply embedded in reason.  They influence what 
                                                                                                       
about you, then good things that happen to you will make me happy too, as if 
they had happened to me.  In a sense, what counts as “me” has expanded 
through my caring about you—even though that expansion was not my 
intention.  Second, and more narrowly, when I refer to caring I mean the 
feelings, moods, and affects associated with compassion as discussed in 
Maroney, Law and Emotion, supra note 5.  
9  See generally WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY:  POWER AND 
FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 52 (1995) (explaining how the portrayal of 
victims as helpless and in continual need of governmental protection can cause 
further harm and disempowerment). 
10  See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:  
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV 1331, 
1336 (1988) (“[R]acism is a central ideological underpinning of American 
society.”). 
11  See generally Maroney, Law and Emotion, supra note 5.   
12  See SHARON R. KRAUSE, CIVIL PASSIONS:  MORAL SENTIMENT 
AND DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION 21 (2008) (“[T]he whole purpose of law, it 
is often thought, is to regulate unruly affect through the application of cool-
headed cognition.”); see also SUSAN A. BANDES, THE PASSIONS OF LAW (1999). 
  




we perceive and how we perceive it.13  They help us appraise the 
value of what we perceive:  emotional evaluation is what we mean 
when we distinguish between “knowing” something and 
“understanding” or “appreciating” it.  Finally, emotions are the 
engines of action.  They drive us to act, help us make and implement 
choices, and orient our goals.  From this perspective, emotions are 
not opposed to, but rather central to what we mean by “reason” or 
“rationality.”  
This approach to emotion has implications for critical 
theorists, who aim to identify and expose “ideology.” For our 
purposes, ideology is a cluster of ideas, beliefs, and associations, 
either consciously held, unconsciously held, or unexamined—taken 
as “common sense.”  This ideology, in Alan Hunt’s words, 
“provides a justification or legitimation for the interests of the 
dominant class in society in terms of some higher and apparently 
universal interest of all classes.”14  According to E.B. Thompson, 
law itself is ideological, to the extent that it allies itself with justice 
while masking, when necessary, actual injustice.15  Critical legal 
theorists have described this as the “legitimation function” of law: 
every conflict is an opportunity for lawyers to declare that “the 
                                                                                                       
13  See Maroney, Emotional Competence, supra note 5, at 1407 (“[N]ot 
only is emotion not the natural enemy of rationality, it is intimately connected 
to the perception and processing of information, appraisal of value, formation 
of goals, motivation of behavior, and implementation of choice”). 
14  ALAN HUNT, EXPLORATIONS IN LAW AND SOCIETY:  TOWARDS A 
CONSTITUTIVE THEORY OF LAW 121 (1993). 
15  E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS:  THE ORIGIN OF THE 
BLACK ACT 263 (1975) (“If the law is evidently partial and unjust, then it will 
mask nothing, legitimize nothing, contribute nothing to any class’s hegemony.  
The essential precondition for the effectiveness of law, in its function as 
ideology, is that it shall display an independence from gross manipulation and 
shall seem to be just.  It cannot seem to be so without upholding its own logic 
and criteria of equity:  indeed, on occasion, by actually being just.”).  Thurman 
Arnold makes a similar claim even more forcefully, arguing “[T]he function of 
law is not so much to guide society, as to comfort it . . . Though the notion of 
a ‘rule of law’ may be the moral background of revolt, it ordinarily operates to 
induce acceptance of things as they are. It does this by creating a realm 
somewhere within the mystical haze beyond the courts, where all our dreams 
of justice in an unjust world come true . . . . From a practical point of view it is 
the greatest instrument of social stability because it recognizes every one of the 
yearnings of the underprivileged, and gives them a forum in which those 
yearnings can achieve official approval without involving any particular action 
which might joggle the existing pyramid of power.”  THURMAN ARNOLD, THE 
SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 34-35 (1935). 
 




system works.”16  
But we need not wander into the thickets of trying to 
evaluate the legitimacy of the legal system as a whole to see the 
point that legal rules may serve an ideological function.  When 
human beings could be bought, sold, bequeathed, rented, and 
mortgaged, the ability to do these things shaped understandings of 
property and of personhood.  When legal rules incorporate ideology, 
they help legitimate privilege in the guise of reflecting truth.  Critical 
legal theorists are committed to discovering and de-legitimating this 
kind of hidden privilege.  Understanding emotion and reason as 
inextricable helps us see that if discovering that seemingly neutral 
rules, practices, or institutions benefit one group at the expense of 
another fills the reader with outrage or anger and inspires her to act, 
critical legal theory is an emotional as well as an intellectual project.17 
This understanding of critical legal theorists as emotional 
entrepreneurs,18 and the importance of the emotional dimension of 
ideology critique, has a history.  Stowe’s aim of getting her readers to 
“feel right” stemmed from, and built on, an eighteenth-century 
English development that Karen Halttunen calls the “culture of 
sensibility.”19  Nineteenth-century Americans adopted this culture of 
sensibility, drawing on it to develop a language of rights.  Elizabeth 
Clark argues, for instance, that stories describing “the suffering 
slave” became popular with Northern readers in 1830s America, and 
helped contribute to the idea that freedom from pain and coercion 
                                                                                                       
16  See Crenshaw, supra note 10, at 1352. 
17  Even the critical theorist’s signature interpretive method—the 
“attempt[] to expose hidden meaning from the person making the expression 
and not the expression itself—is known by its association with a mood:  the 
“hermeneutics of suspicion.”  See Andrew F. Sunter, TWAIL as Naturalized 
Epistemological Inquiry, 20 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 475, 498 (2007).  Paul Ricoeur 
originally coined the phrase to describe the interpretive methods of Freud, 
Marx, and Nietzsche.  Id. at 499-500. 
18  Here, I am expanding the term “sympathy entrepreneurs,” which 
Clark uses to describe individuals and organizations that consciously “help[] to 
set the cultural parameters of what we recognize as plights.”  CLARK, supra 
note 2, at 85.  
19  See Karen Halttunen, Humanitarianism and the Pornography of Pain in 
Anglo-American Culture, 100 AM. HIST. REV. 303 (1995).  Halttunen argues that 
“[t]he culture of sensibility steadily broadened the arena within which 
humanitarian feeling was encouraged to operate, extending compassion to 
animals and to previously despised types of persons including slaves, criminals, 
and the insane and generating a reformist critique of forms of cruelty that had 
once gone unquestioned.”  Id. at 303.   
  




was a fundamental human right.20 
In the twentieth century, Eva Illouz argues, the language of 
psychology infiltrated popular culture, the home, and the 
workplace.21  We now live in a “culture of therapy” in which 
skillfully identifying, expressing, and managing one’s emotions is an 
important marker of middle-class status.  Ensuring that we “feel 
right” is thus a cultural preoccupation that embraces, and extends 
well beyond, law and legal theory. 
 
II. CAPITALISM, IDEOLOGY, AND EMOTION 
 
Marx’s dazzling analysis of capitalism and his conviction 
that the laws of historical materialism would bring on the revolution 
of the proletariat as inevitably as the sun rises are still riveting to 
contemporary theorists.  One reason is his skill at describing 
suffering and evoking compassion.  His concepts of alienation and 
commodity fetishism draw the reader’s attention to the worker’s 
body and mind, revealing suffering and the system’s attempt to deny 
or make invisible that suffering.  In Marx’s view, under capitalist 
production the worker is alienated (or “estranged”) from the 
product of her labor and also from the process of production.  
“Alienation” means, among other things, the disruption of a kind of 
behavior that Marx identified as inherent to human nature (which he 
called “species-being”).22  For Marx, intrinsic to human species-
being is the capacity and urge to make things and, in the process, to 
re-create oneself and all of nature; as Marx put it, man makes his 
life-activity itself an object of his will.23  Under capitalist production, 
however, the worker no longer experiences her labor as her own:  it 
belongs to someone else, and the harder she works, the less of 
herself she owns.24  The product of her labor, the commodity—
                                                                                                       
20  Elizabeth B. Clark, “The Sacred Rights of the Weak”:  Pain, Sympathy, 
and the Culture of Individual Rights in Antebellum America, 82 J. AM. HIST. 463, 463 
(1995). 
21  See generally EVA ILLOUZ, SAVING THE MODERN SOUL:  THERAPY, 
EMOTIONS, AND THE CULTURE OF SELF-HELP 1 (2008). 
22  See Karl Marx, Estranged Labor, in ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844, reprinted in THE POLITICAL THEORY READER 137, 138 
(Paul Schumaker ed., 2010). 
23  Id. at 139. 
24  Id. at 138 (“The alienation of the worker in his product means not 
only that his labor becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists 
outside him, independently, as something alien to him, and that it becomes a 
power of its own confronting him; it means that the life which he has 
conferred on the object confronts him as something hostile and alien”). 
 




described by Marx as nothing but “congealed labor”—similarly 
appears alien to the worker25.  This alienation produces a deep 
unhappiness: 
[I]n his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but 
denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does 
not develop freely his physical and mental energy but 
mortifies his body and ruins his mind.  The worker 
therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his 
work feels outside himself.  He is at home when he is 
not working, and when he is working he is not at home.  
His labor is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is 
forced labor.26 
Following Marx, contemporary theorists have suggested that 
workers suffer not only from having their creativity thwarted, but 
from having their own emotionality turned into a commodity.  
Feminist sociologists, following Arlie Hochschild, have named 
“emotional labor” as a vivid example of alienation.27  Many service 
jobs require laborers to produce an emotional experience for the 
customer.  Flight attendants, waitresses, professional escorts, nurses, 
retail and childcare workers, Disneyland employees, sex workers, 
and therapists of various kinds, are required to seem to care, and in 
laboring to do so, may experience an exhausting disconnect between 
their smiling, laughing, flirting bodies and their subjective emotional 
state, which may be boredom, sadness, numbness, or anger.  This is 
alienation:  not only from the other (because the caring connection 
does not feel real to the person affecting to care), but also from the 
self (because the person affecting to care experiences the body-mind 
itself as fragmented, lacking integrity, “inauthentic”).28   
                                                                                                       
25  Id. at 137. 
26  Id. at 138. 
27  See, e.g., ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART:  
COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN FEELING 7 (1985). 
28  When caring is commodified, workers may experience another 
kind of disconnect:  between their subjective experience of caring and their 
impulse, directed by the incentive structure of their employment, to function 
as a rational profit-maximizer.  Nancy Folbre and Katherine Silbaugh, for 
instance, argue that women’s emotional labor is hyper-exploited in the 
workplace and the home because women are supposed to accept caring as its 
own reward.  In a capitalist context, this produces the worst of both worlds:  
Women are materially exploited if they work for less than their labor is worth, 
but if they attempt to negotiate adequate wages, they are shamed as heartless 
and uncaring.  See generally NANCY FOLBRE, THE INVISIBLE HEART:  
ECONOMICS AND FAMILY VALUES (2002); Nancy Folbre & M.V. Lee Badgett, 
  




The pain and disorientation caused by these internal 
contradictions and physical and emotional suffering, Marx thought, 
would eventually rouse workers to rebel against the capitalist system 
itself.  While workers constantly do rebel in large and small ways 
against the conditions of their employment–finding ways to “get by” 
or “get back,” instigating or joining unions—the global revolution 
Marx expected has not materialized.  Instead, two other emotional 
phenomena Marx identified, which he called “human nature 
alienation” and “fellow beings alienation,” have pervaded the social 
world.  These forms of alienation not only create suffering, but 
inhibit compassion. 
Under human nature alienation, the body-mind energetic 
reaction of caring, denied expression in acts of creation, may be 
turned perversely toward destruction.  For instance, the industrial 
production of food leads to conditions in slaughterhouses and farms 
that make caring for and about animals difficult.  Huge numbers of 
animals are crammed into small spaces and raised in a short span of 
time, with technology replacing human labor whenever possible.  
Jonathan Safran Foer interviews a slaughterhouse worker about the 
feelings associated with killing animals on an industrial scale and 
finds that frustrated caring can become a form of worker suffering: 
The worst thing, worse than the physical danger, is the 
emotional toll.  If you work in the stick pit for any 
period of time, you develop an attitude that lets you kill 
things but doesn’t let you care.  You may look a hog in 
the eye that’s walking around down in the blood pit with 
you and think, God, that really isn’t a bad-looking 
animal.  You may want to pet it.  Pigs down on the kill 
floor have come up and nuzzled me like a puppy.  Two 
minutes later I had to kill them—beat them to death 
with a pipe . . . . When I worked upstairs taking hogs’ 
guts out, I could cop an attitude that I was working on a 
production line, helping to feed people.  But down in 
the stick pit I wasn’t feeding people.  I was killing 
things.29 
                                                                                                       
Assigning Care:  Gender Norms and Economic Outcomes, 138 INT’L LABOUR REV. 
273 (1999); Katherine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love:  Housework and the Law, 
91 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1996). 
29  JONATHAN SAFRAN FOER, EATING ANIMALS 254 (2010).  As Foer 
describes the process at a typical slaughter facility: 
 
[c]attle are led through a chute into a knocking box—usually a large 
 




 In some cases, frustrated caring can become cruelty. Foer 
notes that when slaughterhouse expert Temple Grandin first began 
to record abuses against animals, she “reported witnessing 
‘deliberate acts of cruelty occurring on a regular basis’ at 32 percent 
of the [slaughterhouses] she surveyed during announced visits in the 
United States.”30  Despite subsequent improvements, in a more 
recent survey of beef plants, Grandin found that twenty-five percent 
of the slaughterhouses she visited had abuses so severe that they 
automatically failed her audit.31  As an example, Grandin describes a 
worker “dismembering a fully conscious cow, cows waking up on 
the bleed rail, and workers ‘poking cows in the anus area with an 
electric prod.’ ”32 
The final form of alienation Marx identified is fellow-beings 
alienation, under which capitalism weakens humans’ emotional ties 
to one another.33  The opposed interests of owner and worker 
clearly encourage this alienation, for one’s profit is the other’s loss.  
                                                                                                       
cylindrical hold through which the head pokes.  The stun operator, or 
‘knocker,’ presses a large pneumatic gun between the cow’s eyes.  A 
steel bolt shoots into the cow’s skull and then retracts back into the 
gun, usually rendering the animal unconscious or causing death . . . . 
In twelve seconds or less, the knocked cow—unconscious, semi-
conscious, fully conscious, or dead—moves down the line to arrive at 
the ‘shackler,’ who attaches a chain around one of the hind legs and 
hoists the animal into the air. From the shackler, the animal, now 
dangling from a leg, is mechanically moved to a “sticker,” who cuts 
the carotid arteries and a jugular vein in the neck.  The animal is again 
mechanically moved to a “bleed rail’ and drained of blood for several 
minutes. . . . The cow should now be carcass, which will move along 
the line to a “head-skinner,” which is exactly what it sounds like—a 
stop where the skin is peeled off the head of the animal . . . . After 
the head-skinner, the carcass (or cow) proceeds to the ‘leggers,’ who 
cut off the lower portions of the animal’s legs. . . . The animal then 
proceeds to be completely skinned, eviscerated, and cut in half, at 
which point it finally looks like the stereotyped image of beef—
hanging in freezers with eerie stillness.   
FOER at 229-33. 
30  Id. at 255. 
31  Id. at 255-56. 
32  Id. at 256. 
33  KARL MARX, ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 
1844, at 32 (Martin Mulligran, trans., 1959) (1932), available at http://www.  
marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Economic-Philosophic-
Manuscripts-1844.pdf (stating that “an immediate consequence of the fact that 
man is estranged from the product of his labor, from his life activity from his 
species-being, is the estrangement of man from man”).   
  




But the most notorious example of Marx’s notion of fellow-beings 
alienation is what he named commodity fetishism:  As consumers in 
a capitalist society, we lavish our creative and caring energies on 
things, ignoring the social relations that each object represents.34  
Advertising thrives on, and seeks to encourage, commodity 
fetishism.  Commodity fetishism, moreover, crosses paths with 
human nature alienation.  Possessing things is a substitute for caring 
for others as well as making things; possessing things becomes 
crucial to buttressing the self, and self-indulgence emerges as the flip 
side of the disciplinary urge to improve oneself.  “It’s all about you,” 
a thousand commercials promise, and rather than needing to “work 
on yourself,” you can become your highest and best self through 
things money can buy. 
Roberto Unger carefully examines the affective experience 
of commodity fetishism with a discussion of luxury, which in his 
view has four facets.35  He begins, like Marx, by observing that 
luxury involves the enjoyment of a good or service while ignoring 
the labor that brought it into being.36  Luxury has nothing to do 
with either creativity or survival, and its pleasures do not require or 
encourage involvement with other people.  At this level, it is utterly 
asocial, “the consumer’s orgasm.”37  But luxury for Unger contains 
other levels as well.  The pleasure of luxury is also in its signaling of 
social rank, and more specifically, the assertion of privilege.38  At 
this level, luxury is not asocial; it is, however, a sociability that 
consists precisely of excluding the others who cannot afford what 
you can.39  At a third level, luxury is actively antisocial:  “[T]he 
passive pleasures of luxury offer an alternative to the joys of serious 
involvement . . . . They promise us a bright happiness without 
subjection to the risks and disappointments of the personal 
                                                                                                       
34  Id.; see also Isaac Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal Form:  An Essay 
on the “Relative Autonomy” of the Law, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 571, 574 (1977) 
(“Products appear to take on a life of their own, dominating the very human 
subjects who in fact bring them into existence but who no longer ‘know’ 
this.”). 
35  See ROBERTO M. UNGER, PASSION:  AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY 
(1986). 
36  Marx asserts that a commodity is nothing more than “congealed 
labor.” See Karl Marx, CAPITAL:  A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 46 
(Fredrick Engels ed., Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans., Random House 
1906) (1894) (“As values, all commodities are only definite masses of 
congealed labour time”).  
37  UNGER, supra note 35, at 137. 
38  Id. 
39  Id. at 138. 
 




encounter.”40  Luxury thus permits us to avoid possibly frightening 
encounters with less privileged others.  Fourth (and most ethereally), 
Unger argues that luxury plunges us into the experience of “an utter 
and irredeemable solitude, apparent in an experience of self that 
cannot be translated into the categories of established social 
discourse.”41  Here, Unger argues, luxury is not only asocial, but like 
art and sex it fills us with sensations and impulses that can never be 
met fully or captured in social life, alerting us to the limitations of 
the social. 
As Adam Smith did, Marx and the theorists of capitalism 
who have built on Marx’s work recognize the world of “moral 
sentiments” that underpins the world of market relations.42  Marx 
does so by making visible the social relations congealed in 
passionless words like “capital,” “labor,” and “commodity.”  
Reading Marx, we feel with the worker; reading Unger, we feel with 
the buyer of commodities, and both analyses fill us with disquiet.  
Marx’s purpose, however, is critical:  he calls the workers of the 
world to unite.  His task, therefore, is not only to stir pity for human 
workers and disapproval of humans as consumers, but also to view 
capitalism itself as an ideology-laden enterprise that will, and should, 
collapse.  Presented by its advocates as a good that benefits 
everyone through the workings of an invisible hand, in fact 
capitalism causes suffering for the many and privileges the few.  
Thus, Marx’s mission as an emotional entrepreneur is a double one:  
both to reveal the suffering caused by capitalism, and to inspire our 
outrage at the lies and contradictions that underpin the system.  This 
combination of compassion and outrage is meant to produce in us 
the courage to transform our social relations, to join the revolution 
and make capitalism obsolete.  
 
III. RACE, IDEOLOGY, AND EMOTION 
 
However strenuously its proponents may sometimes 
attempt to portray it as a force of nature, capitalism is clearly only 
one among many ways of organizing relations of production, 
consumption, distribution, and exchange among human beings.  
Race and gender, however, appeal to ideas about biology and 
culture—supposedly universal and nonpolitical—to make inequality 
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seem natural, normal, and necessary.43  Ideological critiques of race 
and gender thus quickly become epistemological critiques:  They 
persuade us to question what seem to be matters of simple common 
sense.  As instances of emotional entrepreneurship, ideological 
critiques of the natural not only stir compassion for suffering and 
instill outrage over the denial of that suffering.  They also reach deep 
into the emotions by disturbing our own conception of who we 
think we are, and where we think we belong. 
An ideological critique of race and gender may, indeed, 
subject Marx’s own critique to critique.  Consider his assumptions 
about human nature.  Marx’s account of human nature alienation, as 
we have seen, proceeds from a particular conception of the human: 
for him, a central part of human “species-being” is the capacity to 
reshape the rest of nature.  Although embracing Marx’s critique of 
the commodity, critical theorist Bob Torres argues that Marx failed 
to recognize the ideology buried in this notion.  When Marx tells us 
that the capacity to reshape nature is uniquely human, he asks us to 
infer that it is unlimited by ethical or moral considerations (because 
we easily assume that something “natural” is therefore good).  In 
Torres’s view, Marx’s notion of species-being ultimately implies—
wrongly—that “our dominating nature is a positive force in the 
world, a taming of a wild and unruly natural sphere for the 
betterment of it and of humanity.”44   
Torres observes that the distinction between dominating 
Man and passive Nature is an invention of the European 
Enlightenment, not a universal truth.45  For him, however, the 
                                                                                                       
43  In Nicolas de Condorcet’s words, ideologies of race and gender 
“make nature herself an accomplice to the crime of political inequality.”  
STEPHEN J. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN:  THE DEFINITIVE 
REFUTATION TO THE ARGUMENT OF THE BELL CURVE 53 (Rev. ed. 1996) 
(quoting Nicolas de Condorcet).  For example, Frank Valdes conducts an 
ideological critique of “Euro-American heteropatriarchy” in law, finding that 
legal rules reflect a series of false ideas—that there are only two genders, 
determined by biological sex; that passivity defines femininity and activity 
defines masculinity; that the “opposite” sexes inevitably attract one another; 
and so on.  See generally Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys:  
Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-
American Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1995). 
44  BOB TORRES, MAKING A KILLING:  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF ANIMAL RIGHTS 78 (2007) (drawing on the work of Murray Bookchin). 
45  Id.  For discussions of the gendered opposition between active 
Man and passive Nature that emerged in the European Enlightenment, see 
generally CAROLYN MERCHANT, REINVENTING EDEN:  THE FATE OF 
NATURE IN WESTERN CULTURE (2003); DONNA HARAWAY, SIMIANS, 
 




problem with Marx’s concept of species-being goes even deeper 
than its culture-bound quality.  The idea of species-being is 
ideological. It presents itself as a universal truth, but in fact “the 
human” is a political concept that has produced, and continues to 
produce, systematic violence and suffering.  Maneesha Deckha notes 
that the major narratives of moral order produced by European 
philosophy are all organized around the idea of humanity.46  To be 
human is to be included in “society”; it potentially conveys “the 
right to have rights,” including the right to be protected from 
violence, and the privilege to demand a caring response to one’s 
suffering.  As a corollary, violence against a being deemed non-
human—an “animal,” say, or a human that has been 
“dehumanized”—is morally unproblematic, or even not 
recognizable as violence at all.  As Kelly Oliver notes, drawing on 
Giorgio Agamben, “[w]ho is included in human society, and who is 
not is a consequence of the politics of ‘humanity,’ which creates the 
polis itself.”47 
The definition of the human in this context is inherently 
political; it marks the border between legitimate and illegitimate 
violence, the world where everything is permitted and the world 
governed by rules, norms, and ethics.  Not surprisingly, the cultural 
work done to draw a protective boundary around the human is 
associated with political and economic projects of domination, both 
targeted at homo sapiens and other species.  As Deckha notes, for 
example, when juxtaposed against “the animal,” the figure of the 
human makes it possible to tolerate the industrial production of 
food, which as we have seen requires the systematic production of 
violence and suffering.48  To be an animal is not to have interests, or 
at least, not to have interests that really matter.  Juxtaposed against 
the “subhuman,” the figure of the human similarly gives license to 
practices and institutions that systematically bring suffering and 
death to human beings.49 
                                                                                                       
CYBORGS, AND WOMEN:  THE REINVENTION OF NATURE (1990). 
46  Maneesha Deckha, The Subhuman as a Cultural Agent of Violence, 8 J. 
CRIT. ANIMAL STUD. 28, 28 (2010). 
47  Id. at 33. 
48  Id. at 31. 
49  Deckha examines the productive role of the “subhuman” in three 
different contexts:  the detention of Muslims suspected of terrorism in military 
camps like Guantanamo Bay; contemporary slavery, or slavery-like practices of 
hyper-exploitation; and the laws of war. In each circumstance, once a person 
or group has been “dehumanized,” extreme violence against them is justified 
and their suffering is ignored, or even enjoyed, as in the case of informal 
  




Dehumanization produces a kind of pleasure that, like 
luxury, has both asocial and anti-social elements.  The pleasure of 
degrading another who has been deemed “subhuman” is in part the 
pleasure of being accountable to no one.  In its most intense form, 
torture, dehumanization produces a pleasure for the torturer in 
forcing the body and the will of another to attest to the torturer’s 
power, thereby producing a fantasy of power without limits.  
Enacted within a cultural form, moreover, rituals of dehumanization 
combine these asocial and antisocial thrills—the pleasure of doing to 
people formerly unthinkable, unspeakable, impossible things—with 
the pleasure of social approbation.  It is acceptable to do anything to 
a person who is less than a person. 
Moreover, the animal and the subhuman are categories with 
a certain amount of overlap.  Violence and exploitation of humans is 
informed by violence and exploitation of animals, and sometimes 
the reverse (as when, for example, animal experimentation 
substitutes for experimentation on humans).  At the symbolic level, 
people are regularly dehumanized by being “treated like animals,” or 
compared verbally to animals.50  To be a subhuman is to be an 
animal in human form. 
The category of “the subhuman” and its overlap with “the 
animal,” in fact, carries a special kind of emotional valence born 
from a specific history.  The story of racial difference—told to 
legitimize slavery, colonization, and mass killing of humans by 
people who believed in liberty and equality—took power from the 
twin assertions that groups of humans differ from one another as 
species of animals do and that higher forms of life were meant to 
dominate the lower.51  This logic produced a close connection 
between the inferior races and the animals.  Africans and persons of 
African descent, for example, were, and are imagined to be, more 
closely related to apes and monkeys than to Europeans.52 
Yet despite the just-so story of species difference and 
repeated attempts to stabilize the story with scientific proof, the 
                                                                                                       
torture at Guantanamo Bay.  Id. 
50  For a sustained analysis of the overlaps among images of sexual 
violence against women, violence against animals, and images of 
dismemberment of nature and the body in Western culture, see generally 
CAROL ADAMS, THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF MEAT:  A FEMINIST VEGETARIAN 
CRITICAL THEORY  (1990). 
51  See MARJORIE SPIEGEL, THE DREADED COMPARISON: HUMAN 
AND ANIMAL SLAVERY 20 (1996). 
52  See Angela P. Harris, Should People of Color Support Animal Rights?, 5 
J. ANIMAL L. 15, 22 (2009) [hereinafter Harris, Animal Rights]. 
 




color line is much more difficult to maintain than the line between 
human and animal.53  The more precarious the distinction, however, 
the more insistent and shrill becomes its assertion.  Social theorists 
use the concept of abjection to describe how people come to reject 
as something that is intimately connected to the self, identifying it 
instead as other.54  Strong emotions are necessary to accomplish this 
work:  in the process of being defined as not-self, the abject 
becomes an uncanny thing, viewed with disgust, even horror; and 
the process of abjection is pervaded by anxiety.  In the emotional 
economy of white supremacy, the figures of the savage and the 
black have been subjects of fantasies about the unclean, 
undisciplined, wild body; about sexuality and brutality without 
restraint; and both the seduction and the horror of “race-mixing.”  
These fantasies and emotional lures are, more or less transparently, 
what Freudians would call “projections,” longings and fantasies that, 
unacceptable to the self, are attributed to the other.55  They are the 
product of abjection. 
The task of intervening in this web of belief, imagery, 
fantasy, and emotion is all the more complex because race is 
intertwined not only with our ideas about the human but with 
political economy and class.  Race emerged in part as an apology for 
the violent Euro-American seizure of the means of agricultural mass 
production in the New World:  Indian land and African labor.56  As 
                                                                                                       
53  For example, Ariela Gross examines trials that put individual racial 
identity into issue, showing just how difficult it has been to define “white” and 
“black” in the United States.  ARIELA GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON’T TELL:  A 
HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL IN AMERICA (2008). 
54  JULIA KRISTEVA, POWERS OF HORROR:  AN ESSAY ON ABJECTION 
(1982).  Kristeva begins her examination of abjection with food loathing, 
waste, and cadavers—objects that demonstrate the thin border between life 
and death, being and non-being.  Id. at 2-3.  Subsequent theorists have used 
the notion of abjection to argue that becoming a “subject” requires abjection; 
that is, to say who I am requires me to say who I am not and thus create a 
ghostly other who could be but is not me.  See, e.g., Judith Butler, Bodies That 
Matter, in FEMINIST THEORY AND THE BODY:  A READER 235, 237 (Janet Price 
& Margrit Shildrick eds., 1999).  The philosopher Martha Nussbaum also 
explores the constitutive functions of disgust, suggesting that it plays a role in 
group subordination.  MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY:  
DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 107 (2004). 
55  Nussbaum, for example, argues:  “Because disgust embodies a 
shrinking from contamination that is associated with the human desire to be 
nonanimal, it is frequently hooked up with various forms of shady social 
practice, in which the discomfort people feel over the fact of having an animal 
body is projected outwards onto vulnerable people and groups.”  Id. at 74. 
56  I mean to incorporate within “race” the opposition between 
  




with European colonialism around the globe, the strong justified 
their exploitation by asserting the inherent inferiority of the weak. 
The meaning of white supremacy, moreover, shifted as underlying 
political and economic conditions shifted.  As Barbara Fields puts it, 
“There is, after all, a profound difference in social meaning between 
a planter who experiences black people as ungrateful, untrustworthy, 
and half-witted slaves and a planter who experiences black people as 
undisciplined, irregular, and refractory employees.”57  “White 
supremacy” meant different things, Fields adds, to the planter, to a 
New England abolitionist, and to a hill-country white farmer.58  But 
the centrality of slavery to political economy and political theory in 
the early United States, and the agreement of nearly all observers 
that slavery was centrally a question of “race,” meant that race 
became an inescapable language for talking about labor, freedom, 
class, and work.59  Indeed, Fields says, race became a grammar of 
governance:  “Race became the ideological medium through which 
people posed and apprehended basic questions of power and 
dominance, sovereignty and citizenship, justice and right.”60 
Critical race theory was born from the attempt to treat both 
race and law as ideological.  Critical legal scholars describe one of 
the functions of law as “reification”—describing contingent and 
dynamic social relationships as fixed and stable, and thereby 
achieving fixedness and stability.  Property law, for example, re-
describes complicated and changing relationships among people as a 
relation between an owner and a possession.  In this way, property 
law creates things and people:  It differentiates between subjects, 
who have rights, and objects, which do not.  
As Cheryl Harris has shown, the law of property is also a 
                                                                                                       
“savagery” and “civilization” that, as Robert A. Williams documents, has long 
been used to justify the subjugation of native peoples in the Americas and 
elsewhere. See ROBERT WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN 
LEGAL THOUGHT:  THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990). 
57  Barbara Fields, Ideology and Race in American History, in REGION, 
RACE AND RECONSTRUCTION:  ESSAYS IN HONOR OF C. VANN WOODWARD, 
147, 154-55 (J. Morgan Kausser & James McPherson eds., 1982). 
58  Id. at 156. 
59  David Roediger argues that the existence of slavery encouraged 
white wage-workers to define themselves against slaves:  to define free labor as 
white and to demand the “wages of whiteness.” DAVID ROEDIGER, THE 
WAGES OF WHITENESS:  RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN 
WORKING CLASS 13 (1991). 
60  Barbara Fields, supra note 57, at 162. 
 




place where race and capitalism visibly intertwine.61  Property law is 
central to the operation of capitalism: it puts state power behind the 
capitalist’s control of land, labor, and technology.  Property law is 
also central to political governance.  Innovations in property law, for 
instance, set in motion the political economy of the early United 
States.  Several contemporary property casebooks begin with Johnson 
v. McIntosh,62 the Supreme Court case that recognized in Indian 
tribes only a right of “occupancy” in land, not full title.63  This 
decision has been rationalized on the grounds that, as Joseph Singer 
puts it,  
The tribes arguably did not “possess” the land because 
they did not enclose it, improve it [sic] occupy it, or 
otherwise treat it as something they owned and which 
therefore was reduced to private property.  Under this 
view, when the Europeans came, the land was 
unpossessed; thus the Europeans were the first 
possessors.64  
The story of the Indians as “wasting” the land and the Europeans as 
making it “productive” has played a role in other decisions at the 
intersection of “Indian law” and property law.  Examining a long 
line of Supreme Court decisions concerning Indian tribes, Singer 
concludes,  
Rights in real property in the United States are based on 
a scheme of redistribution from those who were 
thought not to need the property or who were thought 
to be misusing it to those who were thought to need the 
property or who would use it for more socially valuable 
purposes.  This redistribution was based on perceived 
racial hierarchies and transferred interests from the 
vulnerable to the powerful.65 
A second innovation in property law that shaped the 
political economy of the United States in its early days is slavery, 
which legally rendered humans objects of property.  Slaves were not 
governed solely as things, of course; they could be prosecuted and 
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(1992).   
62  21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
63  Joseph William Singer, Starting Property, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 565, 
567 (2002). 
64  Id. at 567. 
65  Joseph William Singer, Property and Sovereignty, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 
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punished for crimes. Moreover, some states imposed duties on 
owners not to abuse their slaves, and some courts imposed a duty 
on those who hired slaves to compensate their owners if the slave 
were injured or killed.66  But these protections were not couched as 
individual rights belonging to the slave; they were reflections of the 
view that slaves, like children, were vulnerable, helpless, and 
incompetent, requiring the master’s protection and control.67 
Contemporary property law continues to serve an 
ideological function in drawing the line between persons and things.  
For example, animals are defined not as legal subjects but as objects 
that can be bought, sold, and transferred.  Their status as property 
makes the idea of “animal rights” odd, radical, and even incoherent 
to many.  Rather than advocating for animal rights, people who care 
for and about animals are encouraged to promote “animal 
welfare.”68  Animal welfare law, like slave welfare law, is addressed 
to humans, prohibiting certain specific abuses and generally placing 
on humans the duty not to perpetrate gratuitous cruelty or neglect in 
the name of human decency and dignity.  Although animal welfare 
law modifies the absolute liberty granted by property rights to do 
whatever you like with what you own (and in this way points toward 
a non-thing-like status for animals), it accommodates rather than 
challenges the fundamental demarcation between human and non-
human.  Thus, for example, if the suffering of animals promotes any 
legitimate human interest (such as the desire to test drugs or 
cosmetics, the pursuit of basic scientific or medical knowledge, or 
the industrial production of flesh for eating), that suffering will be 
protected and facilitated by animal welfare law.  The human—not 
the animal or the subhuman—remains the measure of all things. 
 Yet another example of the ideological function of property 
law is visible in the Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service decision 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.69   In 
that case, the court, sitting en banc, held that spraying 1.5 million 
gallons of treated sewage effluent on Humphrey’s Peak, in the San 
Francisco Peaks of northern Arizona—a sacred mountain for 
several indigenous nations—in order to make artificial snow for a 
                                                                                                       
66  See William W. Fisher, Ideology and Imagery in the Law of Slavery, in 
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slaves as objects and as persons).  
67  Id. at 57. 
68  See generally Gary L. Francione, Animal Rights and Animal Welfare, 48 
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ski resort did not violate the First Amendment rights of Navajo, 
Hopi, and other tribes to practice their religion freely. According to 
the majority, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 
protects religious exercise from government action that either 
“coerce[s an individual] to act contrary to their religious beliefs 
under threat of sanctions, or condition[s] a governmental benefit 
upon conduct that would violate [an individual’s] religious beliefs.”70  
The court found that using treated sewage effluent on Humphrey’s 
Peak did not coerce the tribes to do anything contrary to their 
beliefs, and there was thus no RFRA violation; the sole harm was to 
the Indians’ “subjective spiritual experience.”71 
 The majority opinion can be criticized on a number of 
grounds.72  But one of its powerful emotional effects has to do with 
its implicit reliance on property law.  For the Hopi, the Peaks are the 
primary home of powerful spiritual beings called Katsinam.73  For 
                                                                                                       
70  Id. at 1067. 
71  Id. at 1063. 
72  For instance, Judge William Fletcher, dissenting, asserted that 
“subjective spiritual experience” is at the heart of religious experience.  
Moreover, he suggested that the majority had failed to take that religious 
experience seriously.  Judge Fletcher noted dryly, “I do not think that the 
majority would accept that the burden on a Christian’s exercise of religion 
would be insubstantial if the government permitted only treated sewage 
effluent for use as baptismal water, based on an argument that no physical 
harm would result and any adverse effect would merely be on the Christian’s 
‘subjective spiritual experience.’ ”  Id. at 1097 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).  
Scholars have argued that the jurisprudence of the free exercise clause 
privileges religious behavior that looks like Christian behavior—religious ritual 
that is theistic, takes place in the built environment, involves an elaborate 
belief system, and sharply distinguishes belief from practice.  Spiritual practices 
that fail to meet these standards are frequently not recognized as “religious” or 
as worthy of protection at all.  To this extent, free exercise doctrine retains the 
print of colonialism and the old distinction between savage and Christian that 
helped constitute “the human” centuries ago. 
73  According to the dissent, “Hundreds of specific Katsinam 
personify the spirits of plants, animals, people, tribes, and forces of nature . . . . 
Appearing in the form of clouds, the Katsinam are responsible for bringing 
rain to the Hopi villages from the Peaks.  The Katsinam must be treated with 
respect, lest they refuse to bring the rains from the Peaks to nourish the corn 
crop.  In preparation for the Katsinam’s arrival, prayer sticks and feathers are 
delivered to every member of the village, which they then deposit in traditional 
locations, praying for the spiritual purity necessary to receive the Katsinam.  
The Katsinam will not arrive until the peoples’ hearts are in the right place, a 
state they attempt to reach through prayers directed at the spirits on the 
Peaks.”  Id. at 1099. 
  




the Navajo, Humphrey’s Peak is “like family.”74 For the Hualapai 
and the Havasupai, “the whole mountain is regarded as a single, 
living entity.”75  Judge Fletcher summarized some of the testimony 
in the case:  
Foster, Nez, and Navajo practitioner Steven Begay 
testified that because they believe the mountain is an 
indivisible living entity, the entire mountain would be 
contaminated even if the millions of gallons of treated 
sewage effluent are put onto only one area of the Peaks . 
. . . [T]he contamination represents the poisoning of a 
living being. In Foster’s words, “[I]f someone were to 
get a prick or whatever from a contaminated needle, it 
doesn’t matter what the percentage is, your whole body 
would then become contaminated. And that’s what 
would happen to the mountain.”  In Nez’s words, “All 
of it is holy. It is like a body. It is like our body.  Every 
part of it is holy and sacred.”  In Begay’s words, “All 
things that occur on the mountain are a part of the 
mountain, and so they will have connection to it. We 
don’t separate the mountain.”76 
From the perspective of the Navajo and the Hopi, the lines 
drawn by western law to distinguish subjects from objects make the 
suffering of the mountain invisible.  Property law also renders 
unintelligible the relationship between the nations and the mountain.  
Caring about and for an object, something over which one has 
absolute power, is different from caring about and for an entity with 
whom one is in relationship.  This is not to say that formal equality 
rights create actual equality:  horrific violence may occur between 
equal citizens.  Nor is it to say that formal inequality precludes 
mutually respectful relationships of interdependence; pet owners 
                                                                                                       
74  As Judge Fletcher describes the relationship, “[T]he Navajo greet 
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and parents know that to be false.  But legal ontology does make a 
difference.  At a material level, the decision in Navajo Nation elevates 
the economic interests of ski resort owners over persons who love 
and care for Humphrey’s peak as family.  At a symbolic level, it not 
only trivializes indigenous practices and beliefs, but also erases a 
series of complex relationships by making them unintelligible.   
How do critical theorists intervene in these complicated and 
many-layered conversations about property, animality, humanity, 
and race?  The intellectual aspect of the critical theory project is to 
argue that these terms are all ideological:  they present a particular 
distribution of power as natural, normal, and necessary.  The 
emotional aspect of the critical theory project is multi-layered.  
Getting people to “feel right” first means getting them to empathize 
with animals, torture victims, slaves, or Hopi and Navajo, as the case 
may be.  Even this first task may be more difficult than it initially 
looks.  As Peter Singer has observed, for example, scientists often 
have made the claim that some or all animals do not feel pain the 
way “we” do.77  If animals do not suffer, there is no basis on which 
we should feel compassion for them.78  
However, even caring by itself is not enough.  One may 
wish individual animals well and still feel no need to stop eating 
them.  A similar problem confronted abolitionists: it is perfectly 
possible to abhor cruelty to slaves and yet accept slavery as a system.  
Against this conclusion, critical theory asks its reader to follow a 
path of “naming, blaming, and claiming” similar to the path traveled 
by people who bring anti-discrimination lawsuits.79  The recognition 
that others suffer is not enough; the suffering must be registered as 
unjust and amenable to change.  Critical theorists thus must evoke 
outrage against the ideology itself and the desire to dismantle it. 
Contemporary critical race theorists face yet another 
problem of emotion management.  On the one hand, in order to 
promote empathy for the subordinated, telling stories about how it 
feels to be the target of racism is a useful and appropriate tool.80  On 
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the other hand, such “victim stories” can easily become pure 
“sorrow songs,” enjoyed primarily for their aesthetic value or as 
occasions for sentimentality.81  The story of Humphrey’s Peak, for 
instance, might be enjoyed as a glimpse of quaint and exotic native 
customs.  Victim stories can also promote the assumption that 
people of color are the experts on race whereas white people know 
nothing about it, thus exploring subordination at the expense of 
ignoring privilege.  At worst, victim stories reinforce a politics in 
which groups bid for political recognition by showing how 
downtrodden they are.  Such a politics of victimization promotes 
destructive inter-group competition, perversely awards groups for 
their dysfunctions, and subtly shifts the aim of anti-subordination 
work from the reconstruction of social relations to symbolic 
“recognition” by, and sympathy from, the majority.82  This dilemma 
can only be avoided by refusing the lure of “reform” and seeking 
“revolution.”83   Third, critical race theorists must walk a fine line 
between promoting a hermeneutics of skepticism under which 
racism is inevitable and everywhere, and insisting that racism can be 
eliminated—that “the arc of history is long, but it bends toward 
justice.”84  Accepting the latter notion implies accepting a kind of 
racial idealism, a sunny view that our country is—or at least can 
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be—on an upward trajectory from racism to the end of racism.85  
Not all theorists have been willing to accept this view; the critical 
race theorist Derrick Bell, for example, has argued that racism is 
“permanent.”86  This position, however, has confounded and 
dismayed some of his readers, who feel Bell has consigned anti-
racists to despair and paralysis.87 Bell’s insistence that spiritual 
redemption requires that we fight even if we must lose has been of 
no comfort to these readers.88  I have argued elsewhere that critical 
race theory should attempt to live within, rather than dissolve, this 
tension between optimism and pessimism.89  The goal is what 
Rebecca Solnit calls “hope in the dark”:  gambling on “the 
possibility that an open heart and uncertainty are better than gloom 




In this Essay, I have suggested that ideology critique has an 
emotional dimension, in part because ideology itself is a strategy of 
emotion management.  Maintaining hierarchical relations requires 
that we manage our emotions in certain ways, that we not care.  
Ideological critique seeks to spark caring and to build from it 
compassion, outrage, and the courage to make change. 
Critical theory, including critical legal theory, can be 
intimidating to the reader.  It lends itself to long and ponderous 
philosophical disquisitions, Latinate constructions, and complicated 
terminology full of specialized meanings.  It is important to 
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recognize that intertwined with its intellectual rigor is a commitment 
to caring.  Just as we find suffering beneath the smooth surface of 
ideology, beneath the sometimes offputting texts of ideological 
critique there is Stowe’s injunction to “feel right.”  We must not 
miss, or lose, or dismiss as trivial, the impulse to care. 
Caring happens no matter what; in Kathleen Stewart’s 
words, it is an ordinary affect, an everyday occurrence in individual 
lives that occasionally leaps like flame from being to being, 
reassembling and realigning.91  Caring is occasionally a force for 
large-scale change; more often, it is a weapon of the weak, a small 
rebellion or an enlivening. Caring makes things possible; it also 
makes them meaningful.  Perhaps most important from the 
standpoint of large and complex social projects, caring, when turned 
into compassion, has the potential to subvert the lines that 
ideologies of subordination draw between self and other. 
Roberto Unger sees caring as an opening to the other and, 
in that way, a transformation of the self, or a rearticulation of the 
self, anyway, as wider and more mysterious being than one 
thought.92  Caring is conventionally understood as purely subjective, 
internal to an individual. But caring takes place in culture and in 
political economy, and the opening that Unger extols can happen at 
collective as well as individual levels.  Ideological critique cannot 
mandate these quicksilver transfigurations, but it can encourage or 
retard them. In these moments of rearticulation, new identities may 
form, or transform, and new affects may be explicitly central to the 
change (as when “pride” became central to the public affect of 
homosexuality).  As critical theorists, we might begin to 
acknowledge and trace the structures of feeling that channel our 
own work, from the hope that theorizing can, by revealing 
contingency, spark the desire to change the world, to the 
hermeneutics of despair that pervade most left-progressive readings 
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of texts.  The goal is not to control or direct fugitive currents of 
affect, but to watch where they go, and watch out. 
